The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (ICA) is a United States federal law that governs the role of the Congress in the United States budget process.
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Long title | An Act to establish a new congressional budget process; to establish Committees on the Budget in each House; to establish a Congressional Budget Office; to establish a procedure providing congressional control over the impoundment of funds by the executive branch; and for other purposes. |
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Enacted by | the 93rd United States Congress |
Effective | July 12, 1974 |
Citations | |
Public law | 93-344 |
Statutes at Large | 88 Stat. 297 |
Codification | |
Titles amended | 2 U.S.C.: Congress |
Legislative history | |
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Major amendments | |
Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Balanced Budget Act Budget Control Act of 2011 | |
United States Supreme Court cases | |
Train v. City of New York |
Titles I through IX of the law are also known as the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
Congressional budget process
Titles I through IX of the law are known as the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Title II created the Congressional Budget Office. Title III governs the procedures by which Congress annually adopts a budget resolution, a concurrent resolution that is not signed by the President, which sets fiscal policy for the Congress. This budget resolution sets limits on revenues and spending that may be enforced in Congress through procedural objections called points of order. The budget resolution can also specify that a budget reconciliation bill be written, which the Congress will then consider under expedited procedures.
Later amendments
The act has been amended several times, including provisions in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The original 1974 legislation, however, remains the basic blueprint for budget procedures today.
Byrd Rule
The limitation on debate that prevents a budget reconciliation bill from being filibustered in the Senate (requiring a three-fifths vote to end debate) led to frequent attempts to attach amendments unrelated to the budget to the reconciliation bills. In response, the budget reconciliation acts of 1985, 1986, and 1990 adopted the "Byrd Rule" (Section 313 of the Budget Act). The Byrd Rule allows Senators to raise points of order (which can be waived by a three-fifths majority of Senators) against provisions in the reconciliation bills that are "extraneous".
Provisions are considered extraneous if they:
- do not produce a change in outlays or revenues;
- produce changes in outlays or revenue which are merely incidental to the non-budgetary components of the provision;
- are outside the jurisdiction of the committee that submitted the title or provision for inclusion in the reconciliation measure;
- increase outlays or decrease revenue if the provision's title, as a whole, fails to achieve the Senate reporting committee's reconciliation instructions;
- increase net outlays or decrease revenue during a fiscal year after the years covered by the reconciliation bill unless the provision's title, as a whole, remains budget neutral; or
- contain recommendations regarding the OASDI (social security) trust funds.
Sunset provisions
Since the reconciliation bill may cover as many as ten years, the fifth provision can have the effect of requiring that any tax cut or spending increase, which be approved by a three-fifths majority, or else the law must return to its previous state after ten years. This is responsible for the use of sunset clauses in several recent budget acts, when proposed tax cuts commanded majority support but not the necessary three-fifths majority to suspend the Byrd Rule. For example, many of the provisions of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 would have expired as soon as fiscal year 2010 if not extended. The provisions that were to expire including the $1000 per child tax credit, the 10% income tax bracket for low-income workers, and the deduction for state and local sales taxes paid. The expiration dates in those Acts were inserted in order to avoid Byrd Rule points of order. Provisions against which a Byrd Rule point of order is sustained are colloquially referred to as "Byrd droppings".[citation needed]
Impoundment
Title X of the Act, also known as the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, specifies that the president may request that Congress rescind appropriated funds. If both the Senate and the House of Representatives have not approved a rescission proposal (by passing legislation) within forty-five days of continuous session, any funds being withheld must be made available for obligation. Congress is not required to vote on the request and has ignored most presidential requests. In response, some[who?] have called for a line item veto to strengthen the rescission power and force Congress to vote on the disputed funds.
The Act was passed because Congressional representatives thought that President Nixon had abused his power of impoundment by withholding funds for programs he opposed. The Act, especially after Train v. City of New York (1975), effectively removed the presidential power of impoundment.
In late November 2019, the Impoundment Control Act made news during the Trump impeachment investigation, when two budget office staffers resigned over their concerns over apparent improprieties regarding the hold of approved Ukraine military funds. Among the concerns was the questionable transfer of decision-making authority to Michael Duffey, a political appointee. Further emails released showed that Acting Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) Elaine McCusker emailed the White House Office of Management and Budget expressing her concerns beginning in July 2019 that the White House withholding funds from Ukraine could be a violation of the Impoundment Control Act.
On January 16, 2020, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a decision on the "Matter of: Office of Management and Budget—Withholding of Ukraine Security Assistance." The GAO report found:
"In the summer of 2019, OMB withheld from obligation approximately $214 million appropriated to DOD for security assistance to Ukraine. (...) OMB withheld amounts by issuing a series of nine apportionment schedules with footnotes that made all unobligated balances for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) unavailable for obligation. (...) Pursuant to our role under the ICA, we are issuing this decision. (...) we conclude that OMB withheld the funds from obligation for an unauthorized reason in violation of the ICA.1 See 2 U.S.C. § 684. We also question actions regarding funds appropriated to the Department of State (State) for security assistance to Ukraine."
The Center for Public Integrity found that "OMB's actions did not comply with any of the exceptions to the law's demand that a president carry out congressional spending orders, the GAO said in its nine-page report. 'OMB withheld funds for a policy reason, which is not permitted,' the report states. 'Therefore we conclude that OMB violated' the act."
The ability of the President to impound funds again came into question during the 2025 United States federal government grant pause.
See also
- Reconciliation (United States Congress)
Notes
- Pub. L. 93–344, 88 Stat. 297, 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–688; officially titled An Act to establish a new congressional budget process; to establish Committees on the Budget in each House; to establish a Congressional Budget Office; to establish a procedure providing congressional control over the impoundment of funds by the executive branch; and for other purposes.
References
- "The Budget Reconciliation Process: The Senate's "Byrd Rule"" (PDF). U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Rules. Archived from the original (PDF) on December 2, 2010.
- Baumann, David (April 18, 2005). "Byrd Brains". NationalJournal. Archived from the original on January 19, 2012. Retrieved July 5, 2011.
- "Summary of the Byrd rule". U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Rules. Archived from the original on December 5, 2010.
- "2 USC Chapter 17B – Impoundment Control". US Code. US House of Representatives. Archived from the original on March 6, 2011. Retrieved August 20, 2011.
- 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
- Janison, Dan (November 26, 2019). "1600: Constitutional clash commences next week". Newsday. Retrieved November 27, 2019.
- Byrnes, Jesse (November 26, 2019). "State Dept. official describes frantic effort to save recalled Ukraine ambassador". The Hill. Retrieved November 27, 2019.
- "Did Trump Violate Impoundment Control Act In Ukraine Affair?". Wbur.org. November 26, 2019. Retrieved November 27, 2019.
- "Two OMB officials resigned in part over concerns about Ukraine aid hold, official testifies". The Washington Post. November 26, 2019. Retrieved November 26, 2019.
- "Emails Show Pentagon Official's Concerns Over Ukraine Aid Freeze". The Wall Street Journal. January 2, 2020.
- Armstrong, Thomas H. (January 16, 2020). "Decision, Matter of: Office of Management and Budget—Withholding of Ukraine Security Assistance" (PDF). gao.gov. Archived (PDF) from the original on January 16, 2020. Retrieved January 16, 2020.
In the summer of 2019, OMB withheld from obligation approximately $214 million appropriated to DOD for security assistance to Ukraine. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, div. A, title IX, § 9013, 132 Stat. 2981, 3044–45 (Sept. 28, 2018). OMB withheld amounts by issuing a series of nine apportionment schedules with footnotes that made all unobligated balances for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) unavailable for obligation. See Letter from General Counsel, OMB, to General Counsel, GAO (Dec. 11, 2019) (OMB Response), at 1–2. Pursuant to our role under the ICA, we are issuing this decision. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, title X, § 1015, 88 Stat. 297, 336 (July 12, 1974), codified at 2 U.S.C. § 686. As explained below, we conclude that OMB withheld the funds from obligation for an unauthorized reason in violation of the ICA.1 See 2 U.S.C. § 684. We also question actions regarding funds appropriated to the Department of State (State) for security assistance to Ukraine.
- Smith, R. Jeffrey (January 16, 2020). "GAO report backs private Pentagon conclusions that Trump broke the law on Ukraine". Center for Public Integrity. Archived from the original on January 16, 2020. Retrieved January 26, 2020.
OMB's actions did not comply with any of the exceptions to the law's demand that a president carry out congressional spending orders, the GAO said in its nine-page report. "OMB withheld funds for a policy reason, which is not permitted," the report states. "Therefore we conclude that OMB violated" the act.
- Hals, Tom; Sullivan, Andy (January 28, 2025). "Explainer: Trump's spending pause and its legality". Reuters. Retrieved January 28, 2025.
Further reading
- Dauster, William G. (1993). Budget Process Law Annotated: 1993 Edition. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. ISBN 0-16-041726-0.
- Garrett, Elizabeth; Jackson, Howell; Graddy, Elizabeth, eds. (2008). "The Congressional Budget Process". Fiscal Challenges: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Budget Policy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 4–38. ISBN 978-0-521-87731-2.
- Hogan, Joseph J. (1985). "Ten Years After: The US Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974". Public Administration. 63 (2): 133–149. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.1985.tb00896.x.
- Kosar, Kevin (October 21, 2015). "So... this is Nixon's Fault?". Politico.
- Middlekauff, Wm. Bradford (1990). "Twisting the President's Arm: The Impoundment Control Act as a Tool for Enforcing the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure". Yale Law Journal. 100 (1): 209–228. doi:10.2307/796769. JSTOR 796769.
- Pfiffner, James P (1979). The President, the Budget, and Congress: Impoundment and the 1974 Budget Act. Westview Press. ISBN 0-89158-495-1.
- Frumin, Alan S. (1992). "Congressional Budget" (PDF). Riddick's Senate Procedure. 502–642. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
- Keith, Robert (2008). "Introduction to the Federal Budget Process" (PDF). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. Archived from the original (PDF) on May 14, 2009.
- The Peter G. Peterson Foundation (July 9, 2014). "Q&A: Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974".
- U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Budget. "Compendium of Laws and Rules Relating to the Congressional Budget Process" (PDF).
External links
- Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 as amended (PDF/details) in the GPO Statute Compilations collection
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The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 ICA is a United States federal law that governs the role of the Congress in the United States budget process Budget Act of 1974Long titleAn Act to establish a new congressional budget process to establish Committees on the Budget in each House to establish a Congressional Budget Office to establish a procedure providing congressional control over the impoundment of funds by the executive branch and for other purposes Enacted bythe 93rd United States CongressEffectiveJuly 12 1974CitationsPublic law93 344Statutes at Large88 Stat 297CodificationTitles amended2 U S C CongressLegislative historyIntroduced in the House as H R 7130 by Al Ullman D OR on April 18 1973Committee consideration by House RulesPassed the House on December 5 1973 386 23 Passed the Senate on March 22 1974 80 0 in lieu of S 1541 Reported by the joint conference committee on June 11 1974 agreed to by the House on June 18 1974 401 6 and by the Senate on June 21 1974 75 0 Signed into law by President Richard Nixon on July 12 1974Major amendmentsGramm Rudman Hollings Balanced Budget Act Budget Control Act of 2011United States Supreme Court casesTrain v City of New York Titles I through IX of the law are also known as the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 Congressional budget processTitles I through IX of the law are known as the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 Title II created the Congressional Budget Office Title III governs the procedures by which Congress annually adopts a budget resolution a concurrent resolution that is not signed by the President which sets fiscal policy for the Congress This budget resolution sets limits on revenues and spending that may be enforced in Congress through procedural objections called points of order The budget resolution can also specify that a budget reconciliation bill be written which the Congress will then consider under expedited procedures Later amendmentsThe act has been amended several times including provisions in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 The original 1974 legislation however remains the basic blueprint for budget procedures today Byrd RuleThe limitation on debate that prevents a budget reconciliation bill from being filibustered in the Senate requiring a three fifths vote to end debate led to frequent attempts to attach amendments unrelated to the budget to the reconciliation bills In response the budget reconciliation acts of 1985 1986 and 1990 adopted the Byrd Rule Section 313 of the Budget Act The Byrd Rule allows Senators to raise points of order which can be waived by a three fifths majority of Senators against provisions in the reconciliation bills that are extraneous Provisions are considered extraneous if they do not produce a change in outlays or revenues produce changes in outlays or revenue which are merely incidental to the non budgetary components of the provision are outside the jurisdiction of the committee that submitted the title or provision for inclusion in the reconciliation measure increase outlays or decrease revenue if the provision s title as a whole fails to achieve the Senate reporting committee s reconciliation instructions increase net outlays or decrease revenue during a fiscal year after the years covered by the reconciliation bill unless the provision s title as a whole remains budget neutral or contain recommendations regarding the OASDI social security trust funds Sunset provisions Since the reconciliation bill may cover as many as ten years the fifth provision can have the effect of requiring that any tax cut or spending increase which be approved by a three fifths majority or else the law must return to its previous state after ten years This is responsible for the use of sunset clauses in several recent budget acts when proposed tax cuts commanded majority support but not the necessary three fifths majority to suspend the Byrd Rule For example many of the provisions of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 would have expired as soon as fiscal year 2010 if not extended The provisions that were to expire including the 1000 per child tax credit the 10 income tax bracket for low income workers and the deduction for state and local sales taxes paid The expiration dates in those Acts were inserted in order to avoid Byrd Rule points of order Provisions against which a Byrd Rule point of order is sustained are colloquially referred to as Byrd droppings citation needed ImpoundmentTitle X of the Act also known as the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 specifies that the president may request that Congress rescind appropriated funds If both the Senate and the House of Representatives have not approved a rescission proposal by passing legislation within forty five days of continuous session any funds being withheld must be made available for obligation Congress is not required to vote on the request and has ignored most presidential requests In response some who have called for a line item veto to strengthen the rescission power and force Congress to vote on the disputed funds The Act was passed because Congressional representatives thought that President Nixon had abused his power of impoundment by withholding funds for programs he opposed The Act especially after Train v City of New York 1975 effectively removed the presidential power of impoundment In late November 2019 the Impoundment Control Act made news during the Trump impeachment investigation when two budget office staffers resigned over their concerns over apparent improprieties regarding the hold of approved Ukraine military funds Among the concerns was the questionable transfer of decision making authority to Michael Duffey a political appointee Further emails released showed that Acting Undersecretary of Defense Comptroller Elaine McCusker emailed the White House Office of Management and Budget expressing her concerns beginning in July 2019 that the White House withholding funds from Ukraine could be a violation of the Impoundment Control Act On January 16 2020 the Government Accountability Office GAO issued a decision on the Matter of Office of Management and Budget Withholding of Ukraine Security Assistance The GAO report found In the summer of 2019 OMB withheld from obligation approximately 214 million appropriated to DOD for security assistance to Ukraine OMB withheld amounts by issuing a series of nine apportionment schedules with footnotes that made all unobligated balances for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative USAI unavailable for obligation Pursuant to our role under the ICA we are issuing this decision we conclude that OMB withheld the funds from obligation for an unauthorized reason in violation of the ICA 1 See 2 U S C 684 We also question actions regarding funds appropriated to the Department of State State for security assistance to Ukraine The Center for Public Integrity found that OMB s actions did not comply with any of the exceptions to the law s demand that a president carry out congressional spending orders the GAO said in its nine page report OMB withheld funds for a policy reason which is not permitted the report states Therefore we conclude that OMB violated the act The ability of the President to impound funds again came into question during the 2025 United States federal government grant pause See alsoReconciliation United States Congress NotesPub L 93 344 88 Stat 297 2 U S C 601 688 officially titled An Act to establish a new congressional budget process to establish Committees on the Budget in each House to establish a Congressional Budget Office to establish a procedure providing congressional control over the impoundment of funds by the executive branch and for other purposes References The Budget Reconciliation Process The Senate s Byrd Rule PDF U S House of Representatives Committee on Rules Archived from the original PDF on December 2 2010 Baumann David April 18 2005 Byrd Brains NationalJournal Archived from the original on January 19 2012 Retrieved July 5 2011 Summary of the Byrd rule U S House of Representatives Committee on Rules Archived from the original on December 5 2010 2 USC Chapter 17B Impoundment Control US Code US House of Representatives Archived from the original on March 6 2011 Retrieved August 20 2011 420 U S 35 1975 Janison Dan November 26 2019 1600 Constitutional clash commences next week Newsday Retrieved November 27 2019 Byrnes Jesse November 26 2019 State Dept official describes frantic effort to save recalled Ukraine ambassador The Hill Retrieved November 27 2019 Did Trump Violate Impoundment Control Act In Ukraine Affair Wbur org November 26 2019 Retrieved November 27 2019 Two OMB officials resigned in part over concerns about Ukraine aid hold official testifies The Washington Post November 26 2019 Retrieved November 26 2019 Emails Show Pentagon Official s Concerns Over Ukraine Aid Freeze The Wall Street Journal January 2 2020 Armstrong Thomas H January 16 2020 Decision Matter of Office of Management and Budget Withholding of Ukraine Security Assistance PDF gao gov Archived PDF from the original on January 16 2020 Retrieved January 16 2020 In the summer of 2019 OMB withheld from obligation approximately 214 million appropriated to DOD for security assistance to Ukraine See Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2019 Pub L No 115 245 div A title IX 9013 132 Stat 2981 3044 45 Sept 28 2018 OMB withheld amounts by issuing a series of nine apportionment schedules with footnotes that made all unobligated balances for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative USAI unavailable for obligation See Letter from General Counsel OMB to General Counsel GAO Dec 11 2019 OMB Response at 1 2 Pursuant to our role under the ICA we are issuing this decision Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 Pub L No 93 344 title X 1015 88 Stat 297 336 July 12 1974 codified at 2 U S C 686 As explained below we conclude that OMB withheld the funds from obligation for an unauthorized reason in violation of the ICA 1 See 2 U S C 684 We also question actions regarding funds appropriated to the Department of State State for security assistance to Ukraine Smith R Jeffrey January 16 2020 GAO report backs private Pentagon conclusions that Trump broke the law on Ukraine Center for Public Integrity Archived from the original on January 16 2020 Retrieved January 26 2020 OMB s actions did not comply with any of the exceptions to the law s demand that a president carry out congressional spending orders the GAO said in its nine page report OMB withheld funds for a policy reason which is not permitted the report states Therefore we conclude that OMB violated the act Hals Tom Sullivan Andy January 28 2025 Explainer Trump s spending pause and its legality Reuters Retrieved January 28 2025 Further readingDauster William G 1993 Budget Process Law Annotated 1993 Edition Washington D C Government Printing Office ISBN 0 16 041726 0 Garrett Elizabeth Jackson Howell Graddy Elizabeth eds 2008 The Congressional Budget Process Fiscal Challenges An Interdisciplinary Approach to Budget Policy Cambridge University Press pp 4 38 ISBN 978 0 521 87731 2 Hogan Joseph J 1985 Ten Years After The US Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 Public Administration 63 2 133 149 doi 10 1111 j 1467 9299 1985 tb00896 x Kosar Kevin October 21 2015 So this is Nixon s Fault Politico Middlekauff Wm Bradford 1990 Twisting the President s Arm The Impoundment Control Act as a Tool for Enforcing the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure Yale Law Journal 100 1 209 228 doi 10 2307 796769 JSTOR 796769 Pfiffner James P 1979 The President the Budget and Congress Impoundment and the 1974 Budget Act Westview Press ISBN 0 89158 495 1 Frumin Alan S 1992 Congressional Budget PDF Riddick s Senate Procedure 502 642 Washington D C Government Printing Office Keith Robert 2008 Introduction to the Federal Budget Process PDF Washington D C Congressional Research Service Archived from the original PDF on May 14 2009 The Peter G Peterson Foundation July 9 2014 Q amp A Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 U S Congress House of Representatives Committee on the Budget Compendium of Laws and Rules Relating to the Congressional Budget Process PDF External linksCongressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 as amended PDF details in the GPO Statute Compilations collection